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An Analysis of European Political




This article will analyze the role of the European Communities
(EC) in the area of conflict resolution by examining the Persian Gulf
War and the EC's response to that crisis. Specifically, this article
will attempt to answer several questions posed by the European
Communities' involvement in conflict resolution. First, what are the
EC's mechanisms for the resolution of external political disputes,
and how effective were they during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict? Sec-
ond, what factors constrain the process of making a common foreign
policy in the EC? Finally, what institutional arrangements would en-
hance the EC's ability to implement a common foreign policy?
A brief history of the EC and a description of the EC's policy-
making procedures will provide background for the analysis. In par-
ticular, the efficacy of the system'of European Political Cooperation
(EPC) in Title III of the Single European Act1 will be explored in
light of the Persian Gulf War and its aftermath. To facilitate clarity,
the conflict will be analyzed in terms of the following four phases:
the invasion of Kuwait, the entrenchment of Saddam Hussein, the
actual fighting period, and the aftermath.
A widely-held perception is that the EC failed the "first test" of
its ability to formulate and implement a common foreign policy dur-
ing the Gulf War.' However, this article argues that the response of
the EC was swift and decisive in the first phase of the crisis, but as
the national interests of the twelve Member States diverged, Euro-
pean unity gradually disintegrated, and the execution of a common
* LLM, Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank her parents
and Professor Jane E. Stromseth for their indispensable help and encouragement. All errors,
omissions, and opinions expressed within are, of course, the author's sole responsibility.
1. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987), [hereinafter SEA].
2. See Kirkpatrick, Is the European Community Finished?, Wash. Post, May 13, 1991,
at 11, col. 5; Pfaff, A Bad War for Europe, Bait. Sun, March 11, 1991, at 7, col. 1; Lewis,
Gulf War: European Unity Fails Its First Test, Jane's Defense Weekly, Feb. 9, 1991, at 177;
Drozdiak, Europe Disunited in Gulf Response, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1991, at A6, col. 4.
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foreign policy became very difficult.
Three inherent weaknesses in the EPC system strained the insti-
tutional capacity of the EC to construct a common foreign policy
during the Gulf War. The absence of a common security policy in
the EC, the unanimity voting requirement in the EPC, and the inter-
governmental, as opposed to supranational, structure of the EPC
constrained the Community's ability to resolve conflicts. In spite of
these constraints, the Community was able to counter the Iraqi inva-
sion by imposing an embargo, coordinating humanitarian relief, and
initiating proposals to protect the Kurds and try Saddam Hussein in
the aftermath of the war. These policies support the notion that the
EC is capable of formulating and implementing a common foreign
policy and that its ability to resolve international conflicts will grow.
II. Policy-making in the EC
The European Communities are composed of three separate
communities in Europe: the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC),a the European Economic Community (EEC),' and the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 5 The ECSC was es-
tablished by treaty on April 18, 1951, and included the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.6 Six years later, on March 25, 1957, two treaties estab-
lishing the EEC and Euratom (known as the treaties of Rome) were
signed by the "original six" founding nations of the ECSC.7 Gradu-
ally, the EC expanded to encompass twelve Member States: Den-
mark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1972;8 Greece
joined in 1979; 9 and Spain and Portugal joined in 1985.10
While the ECSC created a single market in coal and steel and
Euratom regulated atomic energy, the EEC was designed to create
an economic community of much wider scope. The institutions of the
EEC and Euratom were modelled after the ECSC. After the Merger
Treaty in 1965, the High Authority of the ECSC merged with the
EEC and Euratom Commission to form the new Commission.'1
Likewise, the Council of Ministers of the ECSC combined with that
3. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
5. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 169 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty].
6. ECSC Treaty, supra note 3.
7. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, Euratom Treaty, supra note 5.
8. 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 2) 1 (1973).
9. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 1 (1979).
10. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1985).




of the EEC and Euratom to become a single Council. 2 Thus, the
three communities continue to function as separate entities with
shared institutions.
The goals behind the establishment of the EC were to achieve'
economic recovery after the devastation of World War II and to
counter Soviet influence in Europe.' 3 In 1950 M. Robert Schuman,
the French Foreign Minister, proposed that the coal and steel indus-
tries of France and Germany be fused as the first step towards a
European federation."4 The Schuman proposal resulted in the forma-
tion of the ECSC. However, not all attempts at European unity were
as successful. For example, the Treaty Establishing the European
Defense Community, signed in May 1952, was never ratified by the
French Parliament.' 5
The original six founding nations of the EC contemplated pri-
marily an economic union that would provide the economic benefits
of an economy of scale without diminishing each nations' sover-
eignty.'" The United Kingdom declined to join the EC in the begin-
ning because the British feared a loss of sovereignty and were skepti-
cal of the predicted economic gains of membership. None of the
three treaties establishing the ECSC, EEC, or Euratom specifically
provides for a system of coordinating foreign policies in a manner
like the existing EPC. Harmonizing foreign policies was not one of
the original objectives of the EC. Therefore, the extent to which the
Member States have been able to coordinate their policies is related
to the increased integration within the Community.
Policy-making in the EC differs depending on whether the sub-
ject matter of the policy concerns the Community's economic rela-
tions or other relations. 7 This is a result of the original goals of the
Treaties of Rome (i.e. the primary intent of the EC founders was to
establish an economic union which would gradually foster greater
social and political union in Western Europe). To promote economic
union, several institutions were created which handle internal deci-
sions on the formation of a common market. Article 4 of the Treaty
establishing the EEC provides that a European Parliament, a Coun-
cil, a Commission, and a Court of Justice shall formulate and imple-
ment the policies of the EEC.'8
12. Id.
13. H. VON DER GROEBEN. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 23
(1985).
14. WYATT, supra note 11, at 3.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 13-14.
17. Note, A Community Within the Community: Prospects for Foreign Policy Integra-
tion in the European Community, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1066, 1067-70 (1990) [hereinafter
Prospects].
18. J. STEINER. TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 8 (2d ed. 1990).
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The European Court of Justice held early in the Community's
existence that where the Member States have ceded sovereignty to
the Community, EC law takes precedence over conflicting national
statutes.19 As a result, in theory, the Community has the exclusive
power to negotiate agreements with third countries in the field of
economic relations.2" For instance, individual Member States are
prohibited from entering into trade agreements on their own due to
the EC's competence in this area. However, in practice, the Member
States may negotiate and sign an agreement concurrently with the
Community that results in a "mixed agreement. '21 Article 116 of
the EEC Treaty obligates Member States to "proceed within the
framework of international organizations of an economic character
only by common action."22 Thus, the Treaty sets forth the Commu-
nity's preference for a united EC policy regarding foreign economic
relations.
In contrast to economic policy-making, policy-making in non-
economic subject areas remains largely in the individual control of
the Member States.23 For example, Member States exercise exclu-
sive control over areas of international relations such as security is-
sues and diplomatic relations.24 In 1969 the Member States em-
barked on an experiment to coordinate their foreign policies known
as "European Political Cooperation" or EPC.
25
The history of EPC procedures reveals its unique growth and
intergovernmental character. After the December 1969 Hague Con-
ference of the heads of state and government of the Member States
of the European Communities, the Member States asked their for-
eign ministers "to study the best way of achieving progress in the
matter of political unification."2 6 In October 1970 the foreign minis-
ters issued the Luxembourg Report which concluded that political
unification would be facilitated best by harmonizing the views of the
Member States in the field of international politics.2 7 The objectives
of increased political cooperation included "greater mutual under-
standing with respect to the major issues of international politics"
19. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593-94 (Case 6/64).
20. Prospects, supra note 17, at 1069.
21. Id.
22. See EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 116.
23. Prospects, supra note 17, at 1070-71.
24. Id.
25. Stein and Henkin, Towards a European Foreign Policy? The European Foreign Af-
fairs System from the Perspective of the United States Constitution, in 1:3 INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW 61 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, and J. Weiler eds. 1986) [hereinafter
Cappelletti].
26. Murphy, The System of European Political Cooperation: A Brief Explanation, 10
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 383, 384 (1985).
27. Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political




and "harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint ac-
tion when it appears feasible and desirable." 8 A Political Commit-
tee, composed of the heads of the political departments of the foreign
ministries, was formed and periodic meetings were scheduled.29
Three years later, the Copenhagen Report embodied the agree-
ment by the Member States to consult one another on all important
foreign policy issues, and "not to take final positions without prior
consultation." 30 The number of ministerial meetings was increased to
four a year and the functions of the political committee were out-
lined. Moreover, the need for Europe to "establish its position in the
world as a distinct entity" was recognized.3 1
The Paris Communique, issued after the Paris Summit of heads
of state and government in December 1974, further defined the role
of the President. a2 The office of the President' of the Council of the
communities rotates every six months to another Member State.
During the President's six-month term, he or she is responsible for
the management and supervision of EPC activities and holds the po-
sition of spokesperson for the European Council on EPC matters."
The Member States agreed at the Paris Summit to create a Euro-
pean Council and to meet three times a year .with their foreign min-
isters "in the Council of the Communities in the context of political
cooperation. 34
In 1981 the EC foreign ministers adopted the London Report
which was yet another attempt to define and reform the institutional
organization of EPC. In this report, the foreign ministers renewed
their commitment to "consult partners before adopting final positions
or launching national initiatives on all important questions of foreign
policy."' 35 Moreover, they agreed that the Political Committee or a
ministerial meeting would convene within forty-eight hours if three
Member States requested it because of a crisis.36
The Single European Act of 1986 (SEA) changed European Po-
litical Cooperation by transforming the EPC's procedures into an in-
stitutional structure based on a treaty. In Title III of the SEA, Arti-
cle 30(1), the provisions of EPC are articulated and include the
obligation of Member States to "endeavor jointly to formulate and
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 11-12.
30. Second Report on European Political Cooperation on Foreign Policy, 1973 Bull.
Eur. Comm. (No. 9) 12 [hereinafter Copenhagen Report].
31. Id. at 15.
32. Communique, 1974 Bull. Eur. Comm. (No. 12) 6 [hereinafter Paris Communique].
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id.
35. Report on European Political Cooperation, 1981 Bull. Eur. Comm. (No. 3) 14
[hereinafter London Report].
36. Id. at 17.
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implement a European foreign policy.""7 Ultimately, the Member
States remain free to decide on their own foreign policies provided
that they first "inform and consult each other on any foreign policy
matters of general interest." 8 Moreover, they must take "full ac-
count of the positions of the other parties" and give "due considera-
tion to the desirability" of "common European positions." '
Until Title III of the SEA, EPC did not have any permanent
administrative institution of its own. The SEA establishes a Secreta-
riat based in Brussels that "shall assist the Presidency in preparing
and implementing the activities of EPC and in administrative mat-
ters."40 The EPC framework adopted earlier in the Luxembourg and
Copenhagen Reports continues with the President presiding over the
EPC meetings held four times a year.
Although hailed as a step towardspolitical union in Europe, the
Single European Act is not without critics. Some commentators view
the EPC procedure codified in Title III as "an alibi for inaction, a
means for deflecting external pressure and a cover for shifts in na-
tional policy."' 1 Other scholars note that Title III does not define the
concept of "foreign policy matters of general interest on which con-
sultation is required," thus leaving the individual Member States
free to define particularly contentious issues as matters not of gen-
eral interest."2 Finally, some observers believe the success of Euro-
pean Political Cooperation prior to the SEA was due to its flexibility.
They fear that formalizing European Political Cooperation in Title
III will lead to bureaucratization and stagnation.'
The formulation and implementation of a European foreign pol-
icy are complex activities given the consensual nature of the EC and
the diversity of opinion among the Member States. For example, Ire-
land remains outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and guards its status as a neutral country while other EC
members such as Great Britain and Germany are firm members of
the NATO alliance." In the same manner, Great Britain and the
Netherlands approach apartheid in South Africa from radically dif-
ferent perspectives; Great Britain is constrained by its many eco-
37. SEA, supra note 1, art. 30.
38. Id. art. 30(2)(a); Stein, European Foreign Affairs System and the Single European
Act of 1986, 23 INT'L LAW. 977, 982 (1989).
39. SEA, supra note 1, art. 30(2)(c).
40. Id., art. 30(10)(g).
41. Holland, Three Approaches for Understanding European Political Co-operation: A
Case-Study of EC-South African Policy, 25 J. COMM. MARK. STUD. 295, 304 (1987).
42. Stein, European Foreign Affairs System and the Single European Act of 1986, 23
INT'L LAW. 977, 982 (1989).
43. Id. at 985.
44. Tsakaloyannis, Political Constraints for an Effective Community Foreign Policy, in




nomic ties to South Africa while the Netherlands advocates a 'mor-
alist' approach. 5 Therefore, formulating and implementing a
European foreign policy-on the NATO alliance or South Africa is
complicated by the lack of consensus on these issues.
Another obstacle to the formulation and implementation of a
European foreign policy is the resistance Member States have to sur-
rendering sovereignty. As the history of the EEC illustrates, the
Member States only gradually surrendered sovereignty over their in-
ternational economic relations. This resistance increased, in areas
that touch upon national identity, such as foreign policy. For exam-
ple, Greece has been trying to strengthen its ties to the Arab coun-
tries-in the Middle East and resents the EC's approach to the Arab-
Israel conflict." In addition to the general problems of lack of con-
sensus and resistance to surrendering sovereignty, there areseveral
specific weaknesses in the EPC process which limit its effectiveness.
An analysis of the EPC procedures as they were applied during
the Iraq-Kuwait conflict reveals several things about the ability of
the EC to respond to international disputes. For purposes of analysis,
the conflict has been broken into four stages: the invasion of Kuwait,
the entrenchment of Saddam Hussein, the actual fighting period,
and the aftermath. The EC's ability to formulate and implement a
common foreign policy in these four stages was quite uneven due to
the nature of conflict resolution and inherent weaknesses in the EPC
system.
III. The Invasion of Kuwait
The Iraq-Kuwait conflict began on August 2, 1990, when Iraq
invaded Kuwait ostensibly to reclaim Kuwait as its nineteenth prov-
ince.14 In this first phase of the crisis, the response from the EC was
swift and decisive. In a statement dated August 2, 1990, the EC and
its Member States "strongly condemn[ed] the use of force by a
member state of the United Nations against the territorial integrity
of another state."'48 Moreover, the EC asked for the immediate with-
drawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait territory. 9
On August 4, 1990, the EC stated that it was taking steps to
"protect all assets belonging directly or indirectly to the State of Ku-
wait." Specifically, the EC adopted six measures to protect Kuwaiti
assets: an embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait; "appropri-
45. Holland, supra note 41, at 301.
46. Hill, National Interests-The Insuperable Obstacles?, in NATIONAL FOREIGN POLI-
CIES AND EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION 188 (C. Hill ed. 1983).
47. Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
48. Statements by the Community and its Member States at Political Cooperation
Meetings, 1990 Bull. Eur. Comm. 97 (No. s) [hereinafter Statements].
49. Id.
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ate measures aimed at freezing Iraqi assets in the territory of mem-
ber states;" an embargo on sales of arms and other military equip-
ment to Iraq; the suspension of any cooperation in the military
sphere with Iraq; the suspension of technical and scientific coopera-
tion with Iraq; and the suspension of the application to Iraq of the
system of generalized preferences. 50 These measures went into effect
four days later.
The European Communities rejected Iraq's announced annexa-
tion of Kuwait as "contrary to international law and therefore null
and void, as stated in United Nations Security Council Resolution
No. 662" on August 10, 1990. 11 The role played by the United Na-
tions (UN) was welcomed and the EC pledged to "further enhance
such international solidarity." 2 Furthermore, the EC announced
that the President of the European Council would discuss "the possi-
bility of cooperation" with the Arab Heads of State in order to
defuse the tensions in the Middle East.5 3 The Commission agreed to
spend ECU, the European currency unit, in the amount of 1 million
on humanitarian assistance to refugees fleeing Kuwait and Iraq. 54
When Saddam Hussein refused to allow foreigners to leave Iraq
and Kuwait, the emphasis in the European Communities turned to
the protection of Member States' nationals trapped in the two coun-
tries. On August 21, 1990, the EC issued a declaration which con-
demned the Iraqi decision to detain foreigners against their will as
"contrary to international law."'5 5 Iraq's "publicized intention to
group such foreigners in the vicinity of military bases and objec-
tives" was labelled as "heinous" and "taken in contempt of law and
basic humanitarian principles." '56 In addition, the Iraqi government
was warned that "any attempt to harm or jeopardize the safety of
any EC citizen will be considered as a most grave offense directed
against the Community and all its member states and will provoke a
united response from the entire Community.1
5 7
In the initial phase of the crisis, the Member States shared
three common interests regarding Iraq's aggression: liberating Ku-
wait, preventing EC nationals from being held as "human shields,"
and safeguarding oil supplies to the Community. As long ago as an-
cient Greece, diplomats have noted that "identity of interests is the
50. Council Regulation, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 213) 1 (1990).









surest of bonds whether between states or individuals. ' 8 More re-
cently, a scholar identified a "high level of homogeneity of interests
among the Member States"- as a "basic prerequisite for an effective
Community foreign policy." 51 When this homogeneity of interests is
present, as in the beginning phase of the Gulf conflict, the EC is able
to formulate and implement a common foreign policy.
IV. The Entrenchment of Saddam Hussein
As the crisis continued into the second phase, Saddam Hussein
remained intractable under diplomatic pressure and the interests of
the EC Member States began to diverge. The realization that force
would be necessary to oust Iraq from Kuwait resulted in a return to
national foreign policies based on the Member States' perceived self-
interests. For example, France and Great Britain, cognizant of their
status outside the EC as permanent members of the UN Security
Council, both sent military forces to the Gulf in an attempt to reas-
sert influence in the region, and to meet their obligations under the
UN Charter.6" Originally, France restricted its 10,000 troops to re-
moving Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 1
Moreover, in an unsuccessful bid to score a major diplomatic
victory while protecting its ties to the Arab world, France sent a
last-minute delegation to Baghdad right before the UN-imposed
January 15 deadline."' The delegation was dispatched without prior
consultation with the eleven other EC Member States and despite
agreement among the EC foreign ministers on January 14 to "dis-
courage initiatives by individual members." 63 The French initiative
violated the spirit of consultation embodied in Title III and the
terms of Article 30(2)(d) which provide: "[T]he High Contracting
Parties shall endeavor to avoid any action or position which impairs
their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
6 4
In contrast to the active policies of France and Britain, Ger-
many was preoccupied with reunification and popular pacifism.65
58. Thucydides, cited in H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 8-9 (5th ed.
1978).
59. Baehr, Comments on Panos Tsakaloyannis, 'Political Constraints for an Effective
Community Foreign Policy', in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY 157 (J.K. de Vree,
P. Coffey & R.H. Lauwarrs eds. 1987).
60. Whitney, Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25,
1991, at 11.
61. Id.
62. Schemo, EC's 'Common Defense' Put On Hold By Gulf War, Bait. Sun, Mar. 18,
1991, at 4.
63. Wolberg-Stok, Gulf War Could Derail EC Foreign Policy Plans, The Reuters Li-
brary Report (Jan. 22, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
64. SEA, supra note I, art. 30(2)(d).
65. Fisher, Germans Torn Between Pacifism. Solidarity With Allied Coalition, Wash.
Post, Jan. 21, 1991, at A23; Hoagland, Germany: Timidity in a Time of Crisis, Wash. Post,
Jan. 29, 1991, at 19.
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Citing a constitutional prohibition against participating in military
actions outside NATO territory, Chancellor Helmut Kohl decided
against deploying German troops in the region before or during the
war. After hesitation that sparked criticism, Germany sent eighteen
planes to Turkey, a fellow member of NATO, to protect against
Iraqi attacks that never materialized. Germany's pledge of $5.5 bil-
lion for the allied cause did not dilute criticism that it could have
done more to defeat Iraq."6
Another sign of the disintegration of European unity in the sec-
ond phase of the' crisis was the debate on the Western European
Union (WEU). The WEU, based on the 1948 Brussels Treaty, was
reactivated in 1984 amid speculation that it would evolve into the
centerpiece of West European security. 7 All EC members are WEU
members except for Ireland, Denmark, and Greece. Italy, which pre-
sided over the EPC process in the six-month term in the latter part
of 1990, proposed merging the WEU with EPC to coordinate secur-
ity policy with foreign policy in the European Communities. 68 Early
in February 1991, France and Germany suggested gradually folding
the WEU into the EC while maintaining a "channel of cooperation"
with NATO.69 The Netherlands and Britain opposed the French-
German plan because they emphasized the importance of the U.S.
military commitment in Europe and sought to avoid antagonizing
Washington about the future of NATO.7 0 Thus, instead of increas-
ing the likelihood of a WEU-EC merger, the Gulf conflict illustrated
the Member States' disparate views on security issues and thereby
appeared to postpone EC movement toward a common European de-
fense system.
Exacerbating the perception that Europe was in disarray during
the last few weeks before the January 15 deadline were the Euro-
pean Parliament's military action vote and the EC Inter-Governmen-
tal Conference (ICG) in December. On December 12, 1990, the Eu-
ropean Parliament voted in favor of a resolution calling for "no
military action to be taken while-there is a prospect of a peaceful
solution to the crisis."'7 1 Moreover, fifty European Parliament mem-
bers sent a letter to the U.S. Congress warning that European oppo-
sition to a gulf war was "broader and deeper" than acknowledged by
66. Fisher, Germany, Passive in Gulf War, Takes Initiative on Refugees, Wash. Post,
Apr. 17, 1991, at A23.
67. Buchan, De Michelis Wants EC To Take Over Defense Policy Role, Fin. Times,
Sept. 19, 1990, at 14.
68. Id.
69. Drozdiak, Europe Disunited in Gulf Response, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1991, at A6.
70. Id.
71. Gulf Crisis: Euro-MPs Say No Military Action While There is a Prospect of a
Peaceful Solution, Eur. Rep. (Dec. 19, 1990) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
[Vol. 10:3
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION
European governments.7 2 In addition, at an Inter-Governmental
Conference on political union in Rome in December, the lack of a
unified European military response in the Gulf required the foreign
ministers to revamp earlier optimistic assessments on the future inte-
gration of Europe. Thus, as the January 15 deadline neared, the EC
was unable to coordinate or even agree on a military response to the
Gulf crisis. The perception grew that the Member States were ignor-
ing the EPC process to pursue their national interests in the Gulf. In
addition, the United States clearly led the military forces opposing
Saddam Hussein by keeping the coalition nations united. The Euro-
pean response to the crisis disintegrated in the wake of America's
military leadership.
V. The Gulf War
The third phase of the crisis began with the allied bombing of
Baghdad on January 16, 1991. The use of force against Iraq was
authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 678 which reaffirmed
prior resolutions calling for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. 73 When
Iraq refused to leave Kuwait by the January 15 deadline, the allied
coalition began destroying Iraqi military and communications instal-
lations in Iraq and Kuwait. 7 ' American, British, and French war-
planes were used to bomb targets while the WEU coordinated the
Europeans' naval operations in the gulf. The ground war began on
February 23, 1991, but lasted only a short while before large num-
bers of Iraqi troops surrendered.7 5 U.S. President George Bush or-
dered a cease-fire on February 27, 1991.76
Events which were beyond the EC's control and largely shaped
by military considerations characterized the third phase of the Gulf
crisis. Not surprisingly, given the absence of a European security
policy, the EPC process was least effective during the actual fighting.
The President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, told the Euro-
pean Parliament on January 23, 1991: "[P]ublic opinion sensed that
Europe was rather ineffectual. 77 The first meeting of EC foreign
ministers since the war began was held on February 4, 1991.71 The
rotating presidency of EPC had shifted to Luxembourg and its for-
eign minister, Jacques Poos, noted that the lessons from the conflict
72. Id.
73. Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
74. Id.
75. Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
76. Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
77. Political Union: Gulf War Darkens Prospects for EEC Institutional Reforms, Eur.
Rep. (Jan. 26, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
78. Political Union: Guidance Awaited from Council on February 4, Eur. Rep. (Feb. 2,
1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
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"should act as a stimulus toward greater political union."17 9 All
twelve EC Member States stressed the need for "gradualism" in for-
mulating common European foreign and security policies. 80 The real-
ization that the Community had failed to prevent the armed conflict
or even control the timing of the war forced the EC ministers to
acknowledge that national interests were guiding Member States
and that an effective European foreign policy would only be possible
with a common security policy.
Furthermore, an EC Executive Commission proposed changes in
the voting procedures currently used in the EPC process.8" Instead of
unanimous voting, foreign ministers would only implement a policy
after a "qualified majority" agreed to the proposed plan. This would
enhance the effectiveness of the EPC, while a bloc of three Member
States, depending on their size, might still be able to reject a plan
acceptable to the other Member States under a qualified majority
voting system.
8 2
VI. The Aftermath of the War
The final phase of the Gulf conflict began with the cease-fire on
February 27 and was dominated by the unanticipated consequences
of the war. Hoping that the war had fatally loosened Saddam Hus-
sein's hold on power, the Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north
began uprisings in March after the cease-fire. Despite fierce fighting,
Saddam Hussein's government crushed both rebellions and declared
itself in control of Iraq again on April 4, 1991.83 Fearing retribution
by the government, the Kurds began a massive exodus to the moun-
tains of Turkey and Iran. Their highly publicized plight forced the
United States and other allied governments to respond with emer-
gency relief.
On April 3, 1991, a European Political Cooperation press re-
lease noted the Member States' concern "at the situation of the civil-
ian population in Iraq, notably the Kurds and Shiites." '84 Moreover,
the Member States "condemn[ed] the brutal repression being im-
posed upon these population groups" and "call[ed] upon the Iraqi
authorities to put an end without delay to this repression."85 A
prompt, common declaration by the Member States against the re-
79. Goldsmith, EC Says Common Foreign Policy Should Proceed, But Slowly, UPI
(Feb. 4, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
80. Id.
81. Johnson, EC Proposes 'Takeover' Of Foreign Policy Issues, Daily Telegraph, Apr.
16, 1991, at 10.
82. Goldsmith, supra note 79.
83. Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1991, at 1, col. 6.




pression of ciilian rebellions in Iraq reflected the fact that agree-
ment on this point was relatively easy. Unlike the debates on mili-
tary and security policies, the Member States agreed that
humanitarian concerns required a united condemnation of Saddam
Hussein's treatment of the Kurds and Shiites.
The most important diplomatic moves in the European Commu-
nities came from British Prime Minister John Major. His first sig-
nificant foreign policy initiative in the EC was to propose an "en-
clave" or safe haven for the Kurds in northern Iraq.8 6 This proposal
was announced April 8, 1991, at the EC Luxembourg summit called
by France to discuss the consequences of the war. 87 Major's second
initiative was to suggest on April 28 that a UN police force replace
the American, British, French, and Dutch troops guarding the ap-
proximately 2 million Kurdish refugees.88 The EC enthusiastically
endorsed both proposals, causing an American commentator to char-
acterize their move as a "way to restore the push for unity" by seiz-
ing the "diplomatic lead from Washington."89 Another analyst noted
the European Communities' "intensified diplomatic activity follow-
ing the Gulf war" and opined that this reflected "widespread dissat-
isfaction" with Europe's impact during the war.90
Germany tried to address criticism of its inaction during the
war by flying relief missions to Iran with Kurdish aid and by sending
2,000 troops into Iran to build a refugee camp. 1 German Foreign
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also proposed trying Saddam Hus-
sein by an international war crimes tribunal for his treatment of the
Kurds and the EC adopted this initiative on April 15, 1991.92 By
May 19, 1991, the Iraqi government had consented to a UN force
guarding the Kurds.93 In the spring of 1991, the EC Member States
appeared eager to initiate policies and influence events in the Gulf
with a united European response.
The crisis in the Gulf continued to smolder into 1992 because
Saddam Hussein remained in control of Iraq, potentially exposing
the Kurds and Shiites to further repression. By July 16, 1991, 3,500
86. Brock, EC Basks In Glow Of Haven Scheme, The Times (London), (Apr. 10, 1991)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
87. Id.
88. Johnson, Europe Backs British Plan For UN Role, Daily Telegraph (Apr. 29, 1991)
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
89. Longworth, Wrong Turn, Chi. Trib. (Apr. 14, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni
file).
90. Drozdiak, Europeans To Press Bush to Back Enclave Plan, Wash. Post, Apr. 11,
1991, at A34, col. 1 [hereinafter Europeans Press].
91. Fisher, Germany to Send Troops to Iran to Aid Refugees, Wash. Post, Apr. 24,
1991, at 23; Fisher, supra note 66; Drozdiak, Europeans Press, supra note 90.
92. Hayley, Europeans Softer on South Africa, Tougher Against Saddam, The Reuters
Library Report (Apr. 16, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
93. Randal, Baghdad, Kurds Near Agreement, Wash. Post, May 19, 1991, at Al, col. 5.
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British, French, and U.S. troops had withdrawn from a security zone
created to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq.94 The proposal to try
Saddam Hussein as a war criminal receded into the diplomatic back-
ground as it became clear that, although unpopular, he retained
power in Iraq.9" Moreover, Saddam Hussein continued to resist UN
efforts to monitor his nuclear weapons program. The EC Member
States focused less on the Gulf and more on Yugoslavia in the sum-
mer of 1991 after the secession of Solvenia and Croatia sparked the
first major fighting in Europe since the end of the Second World
War. Thus, although the consequences of the Gulf War remain un-
resolved, one year after the cease-fire the explosive situation in Yu-
goslavia dominates the European Political Cooperation process.
VII. Conclusion
The EPC procedure is the basic mechanism at the Community
level for the resolution of external political disputes. An examination
of the EPC process during the four phases of the Gulf crisis reveals
that the EC is still a long way from formulating and implementing a
common foreign policy. Yet, in assessing the efficacy of the EPC sys-
tem during the Gulf crisis, the constitutional development, original
goals, and level of integration achieved thus far in the Community
must be borne in mind. Because the EC is not yet fully integrated
economically, political integration and the subsequent coordination
of external political relations naturally lag behind. Moreover, the
stated goals of the EC founders did not include foreign policy coordi-
nation and some Member States resist transferring diplomatic au-
thority to the Community. The process of formulating and imple-
menting a common foreign policy has been evolving since the Hague
Conference of 1969. The implementation of a real common foreign
policy by the EC is still incomplete. Nevertheless, this article argues
that the EC's foreign policy coordination during the Gulf conflict
indicates that progress has been made.
The EPC system works most effectively in resolving interna-
tional problems where a high level of homogeneity of interests exists
among the Member States. For instance, in humanitarian aid situa-
tions all the Member States want to gain international respect with
altruism. Thus, the Member States were swift in dispatching aid to
the Kurds and Shiites after the fighting ended. In contrast, the EPC
system is least effective after the deployment of military force be-
cause the Member States currently disagree on the future forms of
European defense. Until the debate on European security is resolved
94. Brown, Allies Finish N. Iraq Withdrawal, Wash. Post, July 16, 1991, at A14, col. 1.
95. Horwitz, Saddam's Popularity Reaches Rock Bottom as Iraqs Woes Grow, WALL
ST. J., July 25, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
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in the WEU and NATO and European defense is controlled by the
EC, the EPC process will be of marginal utility in the actual conduct
of warfare.
Three institutional weaknesses in the EPC process combined
with the fundamental character of foreign relations constrained the
ability of the EC to react to events during the Gulf War. The Mem-
ber States, historically independent entities, grudgingly relinquished
some sovereignty to the Community in external relations when they
perceived it to be in their national interests. It follows that perceived
common interests in the resolution of an international dispute are
prerequisites for the effective functioning of the EPC system. Com-
mon interests in the Gulf crisis included liberating Kuwait, prevent-
ing the use of Europeans as "human shields," and safeguarding oil
supplies. In the first phase of the crisis, these common interests moti-
vated the Member States to adopt a common policy towards Iraq.
This common policy included condemning the Iraqi invasion on
August 2, 1990, and announcing an embargo on oil imports from
Iraq and Kuwait two days later. The speed at which the Member
States acted during the first phase of the crisis clearly contrasted
with the European Communities' three week delay in reacting to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.96 Thus, an effective EC re-
sponse to the invasion of Kuwait motivated by common interests
characterized the initial phase of the crisis.
However, as the crisis continued, the national interests of the
Member States diverged and foreign policy coordination through the
EPC system became very difficult. In addition, three institutional
weaknesses in the system exacerbated this difficulty. The first weak-
ness was the lack of consensus on the appropriate organization for
European security; this was a major constraint which limited the ef-
fectiveness of the EPC system. To accommodate neutral Member
States such as Ireland, a distinction is made in the EC between the.
political and economic aspects and the military aspects of security.
This permits EC countries presently unwilling to join NATO or the
WEU to segregate the military aspects of security from the EC's
purview. Some scholars believe that by adopting a common defense
policy the EC would create a sense of common identity and enhance
its ability to safeguard vital European interests.9 7 However, before a
common defense policy can be coordinated by the Community, the
interests of the Member States must converge in order to support a
common foreign policy.
The second weakness in the European Political Cooperation sys-
96. See generally W. CROMWELL. THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR
(The Macmillan Press, forthcoming 1991).
97. Tsakaloyannis, supra note 44, at 146.
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tern which hinders foreign policy formulation is the unanimity re-
quirement in the voting arrangement. As a prerequisite for the re-
lease of a measure of control over foreign policy implementation, this
requirement makes the EPC system possible and palatable to the
Member States. However, it also decelerates the process and contrib-
utes to the perception that "there is no common European
diplomacy."""
While some Member States such as Luxembourg endorse the
proposed change to qualified majority voting, Britain opposes this
proposal.99 According to British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd,
Britain could not accept majority voting within the Community as
the basis for forming a common foreign policy because "that would
have led to paralysis over the Gulf." 100 The paradox is that unani-
mous voting slows the process of policy formation, tempting some
countries to abandon the EPC process in a crisis because of time
constraints. However, it is the only method currently acceptable to
all the Member States. The challenge, then, is for the EC to devise a
voting method in the EPC that is not only acceptable to all the
Member States, but also facilitates consensus on foreign policy at
the Community level.
Finally, the inter-governmental nature of the EPC is' an institu-
tional weakness that constrains its ability to resolve conflicts. Unlike
the Communities' decision-making system in the economic area, in
the foreign relations realm the EPC structure is decentralized and
limited in scope.10' Its intergovernmental nature is characterized by
a pragmatic, flexible approach to foreign relations; the Member
States' foreign ministries are accustomed to consulting one another,
the so-called "concertation reflex" that results from the habit of
working together. 02 However, this embryonic foreign policy coordi-
nation by an intergovernmental process is far from the implementa-
tion of a common foreign policy by a supranational institution. In
theory, a supranational body can initiate foreign policies more effi-
ciently by taking action rather than simply reacting to events with
declarations. It thereby becomes less vulnerable to the national inter-
ests of the Member States.
As suggested by the preceding, there are institutional arrange-
ments that would enhance the EC's ability to implement a common
foreign policy. To exert greater influence on world affairs, the EC is
98. Kirkpatrick, supra note 2.
99. Pienaar, Parliament and Politics: Hurd Demands Freeing of Hostages, The Inde-
pendent (May 11, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
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attempting to move from the nation state to a regional organization
as the point of reference in contemporary diplomacy. The individual
nation state has several advantages in foreign policy formation-rela-
tive to the EC: it has a military, or at least a defense policy; it is not
required to submit proposals to the strictures of unanimous voting by
eleven equal partners to implement a policy; and its diplomatic poli-
cies are assembled by some type of foreign service bureaucracy
rather than at an intergovernmental conference. Therefore, the ideal
model for the EC envisages the Community adopting a common Eu-
ropean military and security policy choosing foreign policy alterna-
tives conceived by a European supranational foreign service by a
qualified majority voting system, and converting the intergovernmen-
tal EPC system into a supranational institution. Reality, however,
counsels that the achievement of this model requires a level of inte-
gration within the EC that is not currently possible.
Despite the three major constraints on European Political Coop-
eration, the process was not without some success in the Gulf con-
flict. For example, the speed at which the Iraqi invasion was con-
demned, the decision to erect an embargo, the dispatch of
humanitarian aid to refugees both before the fighting and after, and
the British initiatives in the wake of the failed Kurdish rebellion sug-
gest that EPC may gradually evolve into an effective forum where a
common European foreign policy is forged. Ultimately, judging the
EC's performance in the Gulf War is determined by what yardstick
one uses. Compared to the United States' decisive policy of opposing
Saddam Hussein with military action, the European system of politi-
cal cooperation looks ineffectual because it depends on common in-
terests, intergovernmental cooperation and economic sanctions in-
stead of military force. Yet this comparison misses the point because
the EC is not a "United States of Europe."
A better assessment focuses on the collective diplomacy of the
Community where the question is not whether individual Member
States could have done more to defeat Saddam Hussein. The inquiry
should be whether the Member States attempted to coordinate a
united European response to the crisis and if this response affected
the outcome. This article argues that, particularly in the first and
final phases of the crisis, the EC coordinated a European response
opposing the invasion of Kuwait and this united response had some
impact on the crisis' outcome. In addition, while the European Politi-
cal Cooperation system is the "world's most advanced model of col-
lective diplomacy," it is still evolving and must continue to improve
in order to convert the internal strength of the EC into "external
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influence" in the world. 103 Measured by how far the twelve Member
States have traveled since 1969 to coordinate their foreign policies,
the EC's participation in the Gulf conflict is cause for cautious
optimism.
103. von der Gablentz, Luxembourg Revisited or the Importance of European Political
Cooperation, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 685, 688 (1979).
[Vol. 10:3
